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Abstract: In the present study, we conducted the first ever Correspondence Test in order to test 
whether job applicants who voluntarily disclose their HIV infections face prejudices in the 
selection process in Greece. Resumes differing only in an applicant’s health status were faxed 
to advertised job openings. The outcomes imply that employers use health conditions as a 
factor when reviewing resumes. The rate of net discrimination against HIV-positive males was 
between 82.6% and 97.8%. Similarly, net discrimination against HIV-positive females was 
between 81.6% and 98.8%. Interestingly, the degree of discrimination was randomly assigned 
and unrelated to an applicant’s education level and job status. The current study develops a 
new methodology that could promote researchers worldwide to conduct similar surveys. As 
efforts to address HIV discrimination grow, so does the need for a set of standard 
discrimination indicators that have been tested and validated.  
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1. Introduction 
HIV infection fits the profile of a condition that carries a high level of stigmatization: it 
is perceived as a great danger and often arouses fear of contagion (Herek [1999]). Since the 
earliest days of the AIDS epidemic, people carrying the infection and those suspected of being 
infected with HIV have been subjected to social ostracism and employment discrimination 
(Gostin and Webber [1998]). Worldwide, there are documented cases of job discrimination 
related to HIV/AIDS: job applicants are passed over for recruitment, and workers are dismissed, 
denied promotions, excluded from social benefits and other entitlements, and refused entry into 
foreign territories for employment purposes on account of their HIV status (Barragan [1992], 
Omangi [1997]). Nevertheless, a firm that refuses a job or terminates employment must show 
that an individual poses a direct threat to the performance of routine job duties [1].   
Sociological and psychological surveys of public opinion revealed a widespread fear of 
the disease, and a lack of accurate information about its transmission (Herek [1999]). 
Economists, on the other hand, have not yet explored the relationship between labour market 
outcomes and HIV status. In the current study, we develop for the first time an experiment to 
determine if known HIV-positive applicants are treated differently in the hiring process from 
their equally skilled, but uninfected, counterparts in Greece. The  Correspondence Test 
approach, so named for its simulation of the communication between job applicants and 
employers, involves sending carefully matched pairs of written job applications in response to 
advertised vacancies to test for discrimination in hiring during the initial stage of selection for 
an interview (Bertrand and Mullainathan [2004]).  
Methodologically, based on Riach and Rich (2002), health conditions can be identified 
by a paragraph in the applicant’s curriculum vitae explaining the applicant’s special health 
status. For the purposes of this study disclosure of an applicant’s HIV status is necessary; 
otherwise, the practice of hiding one’s HIV status is likely to reduce the measurable impact of  
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discriminatory behavior. Since people living with HIV are generally reluctant to reveal their 
condition; collecting data about them is difficult and analysis of the potentially obtained data 
presents additional challenges [2]. As experimental economists, we wish to explain real-world 
issues and to provide knowledge and insight that are relevant to improving our understanding of 
the world as it is and to help solve the problems faced by individuals.  
The data were gathered from June 2007 through February 2008 in Athens, the capital of 
Greece, as part of the Athens Area Study (AAS) conducted by the University of Crete. The 
2007 AAS is one component of the Multi-City Study of the Scientific Center for the Study of 
Discrimination (SCSD). Our estimations suggest that HIV discrimination is a real issue in the 
Greek labour market: discrimination against HIV-positive applicants exists and is significant. 
Meanwhile, the degree of discrimination is unrelated to an applicant’s education level and job 
status. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our 
methodology, the structure of the investigation, and the model used to capture the relevant 
relationships. In the third section, we present our estimations and analysis of these results, and 




There have been numerous Correspondence Tests evaluating health and disability 
discrimination in the hiring process [3]. The scope of these tests is to estimate to what extent 
employers are prone to adapt their recruitment and selection criteria, their job assignments and 
classifications, and their employee assistance programs when an applicant has a chronic health 
limitation. While much progress in the discrimination literature has been made through these 
studies, they have often neglected the issue of unequal treatment on the basis of HIV-status.   
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In our experiment, an applicant’s health condition was directly denoted by a reference 
in a special information part of the line, †Driven by deontological considerations I inform you 
that I am seropositive, that is, an HIV (+) carrier. I am healthy, productive, and fully capable 
of performing all the duties of the position. Recommendations upon request†.  On the other 
hand, for half of the applicants, no explicit information on health status was provided. These 
were classified as the uninfected applicants [4].  
Although individuals with HIV are not usually required to disclose their HIV status to 
employers, they may still face issues in the labour market as a result of their infection.  Here 
we mention two examples of HIV-status-related events that frequently take place during the 
hiring stage. In the first place, it is a very common practice in Greece to request pre-
employment medical history questionnaires. These questions trouble applicants from a moral 
standpoint regarding disclosure of their HIV status. To be precise, we present some factual 
questions from a relevant questionnaire that goes something like that: “During the past years: 
a) Have you ever or are you being treated for, or have you been told that you have any 
sickness or injury? If yes, describe b) Have you ever consulted or been examined or treated by 
a physician? If yes, provide the name and address of the physician”. Second, the dominant 
applicants must undertake psychical examinations performed by the firm's medical centres [5]. 
Such centers return applicants’ examination files to firms’ corporate headquarters before hiring 
becomes official. In both cases, if an applicant is identified as HIV-positive it is left to the 
firm’s discretion to decide whether she/he should be hired. In our case, we choose to 
voluntarily disclose HIV status in order to capture some trends and to help formulate an 
unbiased estimate of the degree to which an applicant’s health condition may contribute to 
her/his chances of being hired.  
Apart from the above mentioned reasons for HIV-status disclosure, we argue that there 
are particular reasons why an applicant may voluntarily disclose her/his health conditions. In  
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our experiment we suggest that an HIV-positive applicant may disclose information in this way 
in order to identify whether firms are prone to providing any reasonable adjustments to the 
recruitment and interview process or to evaluate how the successful candidate will function 
following employment. Employers have a legal duty to provide HIV-positive individuals with 
any special adjustments or services such individual might need in order to help them do their 
job as long as no unjustifiable hardships in doing so are experienced by the firms (ILO [2007]).  
Based on Riach and Rich (2002), it is necessary to be careful in ascertaining, in each 
field experiment that detects health discrimination, whether or not that the relevant health 
condition encounters discrimination when human capital and employment cost differences are 
either non-existent or negligible [6]. Based on the United Kingdom’s Disability Discrimination 
Act of 2005, HIV is a condition that requires only minor changes in firms, and most of those 
changes carry no additional cost [7].  
More importantly, following the AIDS Legal Council of Chicago (2006), most people 
who disclose their HIV status at work want to protect their rights, such that a discriminatory 
employer cannot claim ignorance of an employee’s HIV status, for instance, in the event of an 
occupational accident, after which an employee must apply for compensation.  
Non-disclosure might reflect an internalization of societal stigma by people with HIV, 
and such internalization can lead to self-loathing, self-blame, and self-destructive behaviors 
(Johnston  et al.  [1995]). Many HIV-positive individuals reveal their status because hiding 
one’s health condition is likely to cause anxiety and stress, which further deteriorate their 
condition (Herek [1999]). Coming out at work enables HIV-positive workers to feel more 
confident, to have a happier work experience, and fosters openness and interactions with 
colleagues that can often improve productivity (Klitzman [1997]). It seems that secrecy can 
characterize relationships not only between the patient and the doctor, but also between the 
employer and the employee (Maile [2003]).   
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Last, but not least, the right of access to particular information allows information on an 
employee’s HIV status to be available to third parties, and this information is oftentimes 
repeated to unauthorized persons. From a management point of view, it is difficult to control 
data stored in offices from filtering out during processing. Some people living with HIV take 
the initiative to inform their employers of their condition before this information leaks from 
other sources. Qualitative data show that HIV-positive individuals typically regard coming out 
at the start of employment as a way of avoiding potential dilemmas in the future and of gaining 
self-recollection (Brown et al. (2001), Nattrass et al. [2005]).  
 
2.b Application Structure 
In order to measure occupational access discrimination toward HIV-positive applicants, 
we fabricated imaginary pairs of individuals, the members of each pair being equal in human 
capital, who applied to the same job by sending curriculum vitaes using different fax devices or 
mail addresses. The two pairs included: A pair of 30-year-old single Greek male applicants and 
a pair of 30-year-old single Greek female applicants.  
We applied to vacancies where there was a demand for male (or female) full-time 
employment. These vacancies were identified through a sample of advertisements appearing in 
website newspapers.  
The occupational categories were selected with the purpose of creating a sample that is 
representative of the Greek private labour market. The sample included occupations that 
required different levels of education. Two types of applicant pairs were mobilized. Those 
having higher education levels applied to the primary segment: accountants, clerks, economists, 
lawyers, managers, psychologists, teachers, and technicians. Those having basic education 
applied to the secondary segment: clerks, salesmen, and workmen [8]. This resulted in a total of  
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four pairs of applicants and 8 curriculum vitaes. For obvious reasons, for each job opening, we 
sent either a pair of male applicants or a pair of female applicants [9].  
Each of the fictitious applicants/testers was allocated a male (female) Greek distinctive 
first and last name, a telephone number, an e-mail, and a postal address. Addresses were 
selected such that they would be recognized to be as similar as possible, i.e., they were chosen 
to indicate the same social class.  
Each application was designed to equally convey the type of experience that might make 
an applicant attractive. Higher education applicants had finished universities or technical 
schools approximately eight years ago. Alternatively, applicants having basic education had 
finished high school approximately twelve years ago.  For both sexes, applicants having higher 
(basic) education had six (ten) years of work experience at a post similar to each vacancy 
applied to for employment. To avoid detection, the applicants’ high schools, universities, 
technical schools, and previous workplaces were located in different areas of Athens. In 
addition, male applicants had carried out military service in different areas [10]. Each pair of 
applicants had similar hobbies [11] and personal characteristics [12], including similar degrees 
of masculinity or feminity.  
In our experiment the applicants living with HIV mentioned no pause in her/his 
employment career. They also mentioned that they were fully capable of performing all the 
duties associated with their jobs. Noticeable, our HIV positives were prone to provide 
employers recommendations. By doing so, these applicants give employers an opportunity to 
identify their productivity [13].  
The curriculum vitaes were faxed or mailed simultaneously, within one day of the 
advertisement appearance and, if the firms were interested in any of the applicants, the 
applicants could be reached either through available postal addresses [14], by telephone [15] 
(voice mail), or by e-mail.   
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For obvious reasons, the styles of the curriculum vitaes were different for each pair. Yet, 
in order to control for the possibility that the style of an application influenced an employer’s 
response, those stylistic differences in application forms were equally allocated between the 
paired applicants [16].  
 
2.c The Model  
The most common econometric approach for capturing the effects of discrimination is 
to ask if people who are similar in all observable and economically relevant ways experience 
similar labour market outcomes. In the current study, the probability of an applicant receiving a 
job interview was estimated according to the Probit model: 
 
*
i Y (callback=1) = α + β Xi + e i  ,                        (1) 
 
where Y* is the regression explaining the probability of receiving a job interview;  α is a 
constant; X refers to health status, which equals one (zero) if the applicant is HIV-positive (in 
all other cases); e is the disturbance; and i denotes an individual. In Correspondence Testing 
(see Neumark et al. [1996], Bertrand and Mullainathan [2004]), all applicants must be matched 
with regard to all characteristics other than health status. Since we controlled for all 
characteristics except health status for the two applicants representative of each pair, the latter 
was not expected to correlate with the error term in each equation.  
Equation (1) was estimated simultaneously for all types of jobs and for each type of 
applicant, and we reported marginal effects [17]. For completeness, two models were estimated. 
The first model controlled only for differences in health status between applicants. The second 
model controlled additionally for the curriculum vitae type, sending order, and for common  
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time effects (nine dummies). Notice, however, that the use of occupation and education 
controls was appropriate in average estimations.  
 
2d. Research Limitations 
This study left many questions unanswered. The Correspondence Test can be effective 
only in demonstrating discrimination during the initial stage of a selection process and in 
measuring the results of the selection process (Bertrand and Mullainathan [2004]). In this 
context, however, it is important to know whether an applicant will eventually obtain a job.   
Researchers in this field consider employers, managers, and human resource 
departments as a single unit: “the employer”. Hence, a usual drawback that arises is the 
obscurity of how many employers are targeted. The industries and levels in the occupational 
hierarchy may very well impact labour market invitations for interviews. Unfortunately, this 
information cannot be acquired given the design of the Correspondence Test. Additionally, this 
study by no means represents the entire Greek labour market. 
Experimental economists might initially feel distaste for the deception involved in these 
kinds of field experiments. Researchers may also worry about inconvenience to employers. In 
the Correspondence Test, nevertheless, the unit of study is the firm, not a human subject (Pager 
[2007]). The general lack of veracity in the market place, the social harm inflicted by 
discrimination, and the superior accuracy and transparency of the Correspondence Test justify 
deceiving the subjects of the experiments (Riach and Rich [2004]). The reasons for lack of 
deception in the field of experimental economics is maintain pure subject pools and to ensure 
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3. Estimations 
3a. HIV/AIDS in Greece - Preliminary Facts  
Greece has subscribed to the “International Labour Organization Code of Practice for 
HIV/AIDS in the Workplace” (2001) [18], the  †United Nation Millennium Declaration of 
(2000)†, the †Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS (2001)† and as joined all coordinate 
carpentries of the European Union aimed at managing the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In spite of these 
commitments, however, no national legislation concerning labour protection and HIV/AIDS has 
thus far occurred. In addition, the European Antidiscrimination Labour Legislation (EC/2000/78) 
currently does not protect HIV-infected individuals from discrimination.  
There are currently no statistics for how many people living with HIV are employed 
[19], and we do not know their labour characteristics, and industrial relations. One reason we 
know nothing about the economic effects of HIV status is that there are no representative data 
matching HIV status with economic outcomes. One main cause of this is that social planners 
have not taken an interest in evaluating the phenomenon. Nevertheless, one study of Greek 
firms’ responses to HIV/AIDS, conducted by the World Economic Forum (Executive Opinion 
Survey [2006]), has been quite illuminating. The vast majority of responders (95%) do not feel 
that HIV/AIDS currently affects their firm’s operation. The national findings suggest that Greek 
firms have not attempted to quantify the business risk due to HIV/AIDS.  
 
3.b Descriptive Statistics 
The outcome of the Correspondence Test is presented in a format following McIntosh 
and Smith (1974) that has since been adopted in field experiments across Europe. Panel A in 
Table I presents the callback outcomes for male applicants with higher education (Appendix 1). 
The last row shows the aggregated results and the second column shows that applications were 
sent to 862 job openings. The third column shows that, in 452 cases, neither individual was  
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invited for an interview. In the remaining 410 cases (column four), at least one applicant was 
invited. In 14 cases (column five) both applicants were invited (equal treatment), in 392 cases 
(column six) only the uninfected was invited, and in 4 cases (column seven) only the HIV-
positive applicant was invited. The net discrimination [20] against the HIV-positive applicants, 
which is presented in the last two columns, was 388 cases, or 94.6%. The statistical 
significance of any finding of net discrimination was determined according to the chi-squared 
test (Heckman and Siegelman [1992]). Although the HIV-positive applicants satisfied the jobs 
requirements, uninfected applicants were systematically favored over infected applicants. 
Similarly, turning our attention to male applicants with basic education, the rate of net 
discrimination against HIV-positive applicants was 112 cases, or 95.7%, for which the decision 
not to interview can solely be attributed to the applicants’ heath status 
 (Panel B) [21]. On 
average, regardless of the education level, the net discrimination against the HIV-positive 
applicants was 500 cases or 94.8%, as demonstrated in Panel C. By sending equivalent resumes 
to apply for entry-level jobs, we revealed the presence of strong HIV discrimination. 
Call-back outcomes for female applicants are reported in Table II. Panel A shows that 
the net discrimination against HIV-positive applicants with higher education was 291 cases or 
92.9%. Similarly, as shown in Panel B, the net discrimination against HIV-positive applicants 
with basic education was 156 cases or 97.5% [22]. Finally, Panel C shows the average results 
for females. The net discrimination against HIV-positive applicants was 447 cases or 94.5%. 
These outcomes demonstrate a substantial gap in callbacks based on applicants’ HIV statuses 
[23]. 
 
3.c Health Status-Dummy Estimations   
As shown in Panel A in Table I, the estimated probability of male HIV-positive 
applicants with higher education to receive an interview is 45.2%, lower than that of the  
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uninfected applicants, which suggests that HIV-positive applicants do not receive equal chances 
of access to occupations (Appendix 3). Based on Panel B, the estimated probability of HIV-
positive males with basic education to receive an interview is 42.5%, lower than that of the 
uninfected male applicants. Discriminatory practices severely complicate the job search for 
applicants living with HIV whenever they take the chance to voluntarily disclose their health 
condition. On average, as shown in Panel C, the estimated probability of male HIV-positive 
applicants receiving an interview is 44.6% lower than that of the uninfected applicants.  
By comparing across occupations, we find large gaps ranging from 35.6%-55.2% 
(Tables I and II, Appendix 4). Obviously, the degree of discrimination is randomly assigned 
across occupations and is unrelated to education level, job status, and segmentation. The 
estimated probability of HIV-positive applicants receiving an interview is 55.2% lower for 
teachers and technicians, 50.0% lower for salesmen, 48.1% lower for lawyers, 46.2% lower for 
economists, 43.0% lower for workmen, 39.5% lower for psychologists, 39.3% lower for 
accountants, 37.7% lower for clerks with basic education, 36.1% lower for managers, and 
35.6% lower for clerks with higher education compared to that of uninfected applicants.  
Female applicants living with HIV appear to receive more callbacks than males. 
However, this gender gap seems to be negligible compared to any of the other HIV-related gaps. 
Panel A in Table I shows that the estimated probability of HIV-positive applicants with higher 
education receiving an interview is 37.2% lower than that of uninfected applicants (Appendix 3). 
Furthermore, Panel B shows that the estimated probability of female HIV-positive applicants 
with basic education receiving an interview is 40.5% lower than that of uninfected applicants. 
On average, Panel C shows that the estimated probability of female HIV-positive applicants 
receiving an interview is 38.3% lower than that of uninfected applicants.  
As shown in Tables I and II, the exclusion rate for female applicants varied between 
29.6%-48.8% as compared to uninfected applicants (Appendix 4). The estimated probability of  
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HIV-positive applicants receiving an interview compared to the probability of the uninfected 
group was 48.8% lower for lawyers, 45.6% lower for saleswomen, 41.0% lower for economists, 
40.0% lower for technicians, 39.3% lower for teachers, 38.8% lower for workwomen, 35.2% 
lower for clerks with basic education, 34.5% lower for clerks with higher education, 32.9% 
lower for accountants, 29.6% lower for psychologists, and 27.8% lower for managers. Similar 
to the estimations obtained for males, the degree of discrimination was randomly defined across 
occupations and was extraneous to education level and job status. 
For all cases, we re-estimated Model 1 including the following control variables: the 
type of curriculum vitaes, sending order, occupation applied to and time effects: the impact of 
these variables on the outcome was negligible (Model 2 - Columns 2 and 4). Since experimental 
conditions are equally assigned, these controls do not substantially affect the estimated effect of 
health status, but they make the estimate more precise. 
Current estimations suggest that discrimination against individuals living with HIV at 
work is a matter of importance in Greece. The estimations reveal that firms do not seem to 
understand that protecting staff through workplace activities is a natural first priority of 
programs, followed by looking to the wider community. More importantly, Greek firms do not 
offer HIV-positive applicants the opportunity to discuss any health-related issues.  
In this section, we briefly review the two main strands of the theoretical literature on 
labour market discrimination:  distaste  for the minority (Becker [1957]) and  statistical 
discrimination (Arrow [1973]). 
The basic argument of Becker’s discrimination theory suggests that individuals living 
with HIV can potentially face occupational access discrimination. The taste hypothesis 
describes discrimination as a preference or taste for which the discriminator is willing to pay. 
In particular, the employers’ taste for discrimination is based on the idea that they want to 
maintain a physical or social distance from certain groups or that they may fear that their  
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customers or co-workers dislike interacting with minorities. Instead of making common 
assumptions that employers consider only employees productivity, that workers ignore the 
characteristics of those with whom they work, and that customers care only about the quality of 
the goods and services provided, Becker suggests that discrimination coefficients incorporate 
the influence of characteristics unrelated to productivity on tastes and attitudes, such as HIV 
status.  
The statistical theory of discrimination is also potentially useful for interpreting the 
results. The statistical discrimination theory suggests that unequal treatment is a result of a 
profit-maximizing response of employers to uncertainty about the quality of individual workers. 
In a world of imperfect information, employers face risks when hiring workers, and specific 
characteristics become inexpensive screening devices. If employers believe that there is a 
systematic differential between HIV-positive and uninfected applicants in their reliability 
aptitude and job stability, then these concerns might be sufficient to create a permanent 
differential in access availability. In this situation, discrimination is not the consequence of 
exogenous preferences, but of profit-maximizing behavior of risk-averse employers.  
Keep in mind, however, that more complicated formulations of the human capital 
approach have suggested a wider range of factors responsible for determining unemployment 
rates between majority and minority applicants. For instance, Segmentation Theory made an 
attempt to demonstrate the role of practices at the workplace and of organizational levels in 
creating inequalities and leaving productive potential underutilized [24] (Rubery and 
Wilkinson [1994], Rubery [1995]). The issue of HIV discrimination is then complicated by the 
wide variety of firm-specific labour markets forms, the strong influence
 of occupational factors 
in determining employment practices
 and their impact on HIV-positive workers’ employment 
positions and prospects, as well as problems associated with making comparisons at the 
sectoral level
 across markets.   
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4. Conclusion 
The current study applies for the first time an experimental design in a real-world 
setting that allows for the evaluation of whether actual employers discriminate against persons 
living with HIV in the employment search process. The outcomes show that applicants who 
voluntarily disclose their HIV-status face great difficulty in obtaining an interview regardless 
of their education level and job-status. Citing either employer distaste and/or employer 
perception that HIV status signifies lower productivity, job applicants living with HIV get 
substantially fewer callbacks for each resume sent out. The estimations suggest that 
discrimination continues at alarming levels and that we need to more closely examine the 
effects of HIV discrimination and labour market characteristics on employment for the HIV-
positive population in Greece. 
 
Endnotes  
[1] Based on the Directive 2000/54/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of September 18, 2000, 
HIV presents a limited risk of infection for workers since it is not transmittable by any airborne route.  
[2] There will be considerable undercounting in any official survey due to privacy issues, suspicions about 
the usage of results, and controversies over definitions.  
[3] Fry (1986), as well as, Graham et al. (1990), tested for disability (being confined to a wheelchair) in 
secretarial areas. In France, Ravand et al. (1992) found evidence for differential treatment against disabled 
persons seeking employment. In the Netherlands, Gras et al. (1996) tested for various types of disability 
(being confined to a wheelchair, epileptic, or deaf) among professionals in administrative, commercial, and 
secretarial areas. More recently, MacRae and Laverty (2006) evaluated disability (being confined, cerebral 
palsy, or registered blind) in Scotland. All studies found statistically significant outcomes against the 
disabled during the hiring stage. 
[4] Of course, disclosure is a personal decision that an individual is entitled to make autonomously and 
privately (ILO Code [2001]).    
    16 
[5] Pre-employment screening takes place in many industries, particularly in countries where testing 
resources are readily available and affordable (UNESCO [2007]).   
[6] Discrimination in employment seems to be allowed in situations in which a person, for various reasons, 
is unable to perform the inherent requirements and where no reasonable accommodation can be made to 
allow them to perform those inherent requirements. 
[7] A reasonable adjustment is a change to the workplace or work practices that removes a substantial 
disadvantage that a HIV positive person might experience because of her/his status.  
[8] In this study, we did not investigate discrimination trends regarding sensitive occupations, such as 
beauticians, doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, chefs, waiters, and personal care providers.  
[9] In actuality, our experiment would have been revealed if we had sent both a male and female applicant 
living with HIV to the same vacancy. 
[10] In Greece, the attribute of having carried out military service typically boosts a male’s probability of 
being hired.  
[11] Male (female) applicants were fascinated by travel (travels) and sports (cinema).  
[12] Both applicants pointed out that they were productive and industrious.   
[13] Nevertheless, we received no calls regarding provision of recommendations.  
[14] However, no firms responded in writing. 
[15] For each phone, we use the content of the message left by the employer to match the response to the 
response for the corresponding resume pair.  
[16] For an extensive study of control variables and random events, see Heckman and Siegelman (1992).   
[17] Since the explanatory variable was a dummy variable, its marginal Probit reported the discrete change 
in the probability of an interview offer:  i X Callback prob ¶ = ¶ / ) 1 ( . 
[18] The ILO Code contains principles that should guide government, employee, and employer organizations 
in member States on policy and practice in specific areas, including the adoption of legislation to cover 
HIV/AIDS in the workplace.  
[19] In 2007, the cumulative number of reported HIV infections in Greece ( 6 . 10 » n  millions), including 
AIDS cases, was 8584 (Hellenic Center for Disease Control and Prevention [2007]).  
[20] The most common way to measure the overall incidence of discrimination is to count the number of 
times a minority applicant is treated less favorably in a single type of firm behavior than the majority  
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applicant and then subtract the number of times the majority applicant is treated less favorably, mainly with 
regard to random incidents. The result is a net measure of the number of acts of discrimination a minority 
applicant can expect to encounter during each application to a firm (Heckman and Siegelman [1992]). 
[21] The differences between Panel A and Panel B are statistically insignificant when tested by the z-test. 
HIV applicants’ education levels played no role in their occupational access. 
[22] The outcomes in Tables A and B (Appendix 2) illustrate how the discrimination rates differ between 
occupations.  
[23] The differences between Panel A and Panel B (Table B) are statistically insignificant when tested by the 
z-test. HIV applicants’ education levels played no role in their access to occupations. 
[24] In the estimation portion, we considered the influence of Segmentation Theory. We included education 
level dummies, as well as occupation dummies; hence, basic trends were controlled for. In addition, we 
performed separate regressions for male and female applicants. Notice also that we present paired 
observation for each occupation. By doing this, we gained partial control over idiosyncratic differences in 
employers’ evaluations based on common characteristics that plague ordinary observational studies.  
 
Reference 
AIDS Legal Council of Chicago (2006): HIV and Discrimination: Your Legal Rights. 
 
Arrow, K. J. (1973): “The Theory of Discrimination”, in  Discrimination in Labour Markets, edited by 
Ashenfelter O. and Rees A., Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 3-33. 
 
Barragan, E. (1992): “VIH/SIDA y Trabajo – Fragmentos a Debate”, Sociedad y SIDA, 21, pp. 1-4. 
 
Becker, G.S., (1957): The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2004): “Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? 
Field Experiment on Labour Discrimination”, American Economic Review, pp. 991-1014. 
  
    18 
Brown, L. Trujillo, L. and Macintyre, K. (2001): “Interventions to Reduce HIV/AIDS Stigma: What Have we 
Learned?”, Horizons Program, Tulane University. 
 
Chartier, M. C. (2005): “Legal Initiatives to Address HIV/AIDS in the World of Work”, ILO. 
 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of November, 27, 2000: “Establishing a General Framework for Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation, 2000”, Official Journal of the European Communities. 
 
Council Directive 2000/54/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 September 2000: “On the 
protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at work”, Official Journal of the 
European Communities.  
 
Disability Discrimination Act of 2005, United Kingdom. 
 
Fry, E. (1986):  An Equal Chance for Disabled People?, London: The Spastics Society, Campaigns and 
Parliamentary Department. 
 
Gostin, L. O. and Webber, P. M. (1998): “The AIDS Litigation Project HIV/AIDS in the Courts in the 1990s, 
Part 2”, AIDS and Public Policy Journal, 13, pp. 3-13. 
 
Graham, P. Jordan, A. and Lamb, B. (1990): An Equal Chance? or No Chance? A Study of Discrimination 
Against Disabled People in the Labour Market, London: The Spastics Society. 
 
Gras, M. Bovenkerk, F. Gorterk, K. Kruiswijk, P. and Ramsoedh, D. (1996): Een Schijn Vankans: Twee 
Empirische Onderzoekingen Naar Discriminate Op Gond Van Handicap En Ethische Afkomst, Netherlands: 
Gouda Quint. 
  
    19 
Heckman, J. and Siegelman, P. (1992): “The Urban Institute Audit Studies: Their Methods and Findings”, in 
Fix, M. and Struyk R., eds., Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America, 
Urban Institute Press, Washington DC. 
 
Heckman, J. J. Lalonde, R. J. Smith, J. A. (1999): “The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labour 
Market Programs”, in Ashenfelter, O., and Card, D., (eds), Handbook of Labour Economis, Vol. 3A, pp. 
1865-2097. 
 
Herek, G. M. (1999): “AIDS and Stigma”, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 42, Issue 7. 
 
Hellenic Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2007): “HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report in Greece”, no. 
22. 
 
ILO Code of Practice on HIV/AIDS and the World of Work (2001): ILO AIDS Code. 
 
ILO (2007): Legislating an Epidemic. The Challenge of HIV/AIDS in the Workplace. 
 
Johnston, D. Stall, R. and Smith, K. (1995): “Reliance by Gay Men and Intravenous Drug Users on Friends 
and Family for AIDS-Related Care”, AIDS Care, 7, pp. 307-319.  
 
Klitzman, R. (1997): Being Positive: The Lives of Men and Women with HIV, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.  
 
MacRae, G. and Laverty, L. (2006), Discrimination does not Work: Disabled People’s experiencs of 
applying for jobs in Scotland, Leonard Cheshire Scotland.  
 
Maile, S. (2003): “Legal Aspects of the Disclosure of HIV Serostatus Educators”, South African Journal of 
Education, Vol. 32(1), pp 78-83. 
  
    20 
McIntosh, N. and Smith, D. (1974): The Extent of Racial Discrimination, Political and Economic Planning 
Broadsheet no. 547, London: Political and Economic Planning.  
 
Nattrass, N. Neilson, T. Bery, P. Mistry, N. and Sievers, S. E. (2005):  “Opportunities for Business in the 
Fight Against HIV/AIDS”, Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS. 
 
Neumark, D. Bank, R.J. and Van Nort, K. D. (1996): “Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit 
Study”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 915 – 941. 
 
Omangi, H. (1997): “Stigmatization and Discrimination in the Context of HIV and AIDS in Kenya. 
Newsletter of African Network on Ethics”, Law and HIV, 3, pp. 4-5. 
 
Pager, D. (2007): “The Use of Field Experiments for Employment Discrimination: Contributions, Critiques, 
and Direction for the Future”, The Annals for the American Academy, Vol. 601, pp. 104-133. 
 
Ravand, J.F. Madiot, B. Ville, I. (1992), “Discrimination Toward Disabled People Seeking Employment”, 
Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 35(8): 951-78. 
 
Riach, P. A. and Rich, J. (2002): “Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place”, The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 112, F480-F518. 
 
Riach, A. and Rich, J. (2004): “Deceptive Field Experiments of Discrimination: Are they Ethical?”, Kyklos, 
Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 457-470. 
Rubery, J. (1995): “Internal Labour Markets and Equal Opportunities: Women's Position in Banks in 
European Countries”, European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 203-227.  
Rubery, J. and Wilkinson, F. (1994): Employer Strategy and the Labour Market, Oxford: Oxford University  
 
UN Millennium Declaration of 2000.   
    21 
UN General Assembly (2001): Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS. 
 
UNESCO (2007): UNESCO’S Strategy for Responding to HIV and AIDS. 
 
United Kingdom Coalition of People Living with HIV and AIDS (2007): HIV is Your Business. 
























Notes: The null hypothesis is “Both individuals are treated unfavorably equally often”, that is (2)=(3). 




Table II. Correspondence Testing Outcomes 
 Female Applicants 
 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis is “Both individuals are treated unfavorably equally often”, that is (2)=(3).  
(*) Statistically Significant at 1%.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Table I. Correspondence Testing Outcomes 
Male Applicants 
 

























(2)-(3)    [(2)-(3)]/(1) 









                 
Accountants  117  70 
 






46  97.8  46.00* 
Clerks  101  63 
 






36  94.7  36.00* 
Economists  106  55 
 






49  96.0  49.00* 
Lawyers   83  37 
 






39  84.0  35.37* 
Managers  105  66 
 






38  97.4  38.00* 
Psychologists  48  25 
 






19  82.6  15.69* 
Teachers
  143  62 
 






78  96.2  78.00* 
Technicians
*  159  74 
 












                 
Clerks  122  75 
 






46  97.8  46.00* 
Salesmen  76  36 
 






38  95.0  38.00* 
Workmen  65  35 
 






28  93.3  28.00* 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis is “Both individuals are treated unfavorably equally often”, that is (2)=(3).  
 (*) Statistically Significant at 1%.  
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Table II. Correspondence Testing Outcomes 
 Female Applicants 
 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis is “Both individuals are treated unfavorably equally often”, that is (2)=(3).  
  (*) Statistically Significant at 1%.  























































                 
Accountants  82  53 
 






27  93.1  27.00* 
Clerks  133  86 
 






46  97.8  46.00* 
Economists  73  42 
 






30  96.7  30.00* 
Lawyers   86  37 
 






40  81.6  36.36* 
Managers  79  56 
 






22  95.6  22.00* 
Psychologists  64  42 
 






19  86.3  19.00* 
Teachers
  155  92 
 






61  96.8  61.00* 
Technicians
*  115  66 
 












                 
Clerks  122  78 
 






43  97.7  43.00* 
Saleswomen  162  87 
 






74  98.8  74.00* 
Workwomen  108  67 
 






39  95.1  39.00*  
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Appendix 3 
 
Table I. Probit Estimations 
 Marginal Effects  
 
  Males  Females 





















































































Notes:  Standard errors are indicated within parentheses. 
            Standard errors are adjusted for intraclass correlation. 
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Appendix 4 
 
Table I. Probit Estimations 
Marginal Effects by Occupation; Higher Education 
 
  Male Applicants  Female Applicants 

































































































































































































  *Includes architects, mechanical engineers, electricians, geologists, agriculturists, biologists, chemists, and 
physicists.       
   Standard errors are indicated within parentheses. 
   Standard errors are adjusted for intraclass correlation. 
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Table II. Probit Estimations 
 Marginal Effects by Occupation; Basic Education 
 
  Male Applicants  Female Applicants 



























































































*Includes architects, mechanical engineers, electricians, geologists, agriculturists, biologists, chemists, and 
physicists.     
Standard errors are indicated within parentheses.  
Standard errors are adjusted for intraclass correlation. 
(*)  Statistically significant at 1 %. 